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THE MODERN INFLUENCE IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ROBERT

T. DoNL)Y*

"Much acute intellectual ability, energy, and expository
skill has been .

.

. uneconomically spent in an attempt to

distill from knowledge of a phase of governmental business
a rarefied and sublimated science to be labeled 'jurisprudence'.
"The law is essentially a practical matter. No theory or
effort concerning it can command much attention and respect
unless it is directed by an intelligent recognition of this
fact."'
It may well be doubted whether legal thought in the seventeen years which have elapsed since Wharton's dictum has
not noticeably shaken such a conclusion. For legal scholars
continue to "distill" theories and seem not at all troubled
about whether they are commanding any particular attention or respect for anyone. And to those for whom realism
is a sinle qua n n there is the ever-disconcerting and fascinating field of legal science conveniently but inaccurately called
the "conflicts of law".
It shall therefore be the purpose of this paper to present
* Member of the Bar of M£organtown, West Virginia.
1"What

Is the Law", Joseph W. Bingham, II

MIcH.
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the opposing theories of jurisprudence which relate to the
conflict of laws and to discuss the extent to which they
present an accurate analysis of the material with which
legal science is concerned.
Some English Cases.
In the celebrated cast of Phillips v. Eyre2 it was stated
that:
"As a general rule, in order to found a suit in
England, for a wrong alleged to have been committed
abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the
wrong must be of such a character that it would have
been actionable if committed in England .....
Secondly, the act must not have been justifiable by
the law of the place where it was done."
Rigby, L. J., in delivering a concurring opinion in Machado
v. Foates spoke of this rule and said, "I cannot doubt that
the change from 'actionable' in the first branch of the rule
to 'justifiable' in the second branch of it was deliberate."
In the Machado case the defendant had published an alleged
libel concerning the plaintiff, in Brazil. Defendant filed a
plea setting up that by Brazilian law no civil action for such
a libel could be maintained, but that only criminal proceedings could be instituted. Lopes, L. J., after doubting whether
the plea went more than to the remedy rather than to the
substantive cause of action, assumed that it did go to the
latter and larger question and said:
"The act was committed abroad, and was actionable here, and not justifiable by the law of the place
where it was committed ....
therefore the publication in Brazil is actionable here."
Thus were Lord Manfield's doubts in Mostyn v. Fabrigas4
resolved when he said:
2L. IL (1870)

6 Q. B. 1.
R. (1897) 2 Q. B. 231.
4K. B. (1775) Cowper's Rpts., 161.
SL.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss3/3

2

Donley: The Modern Influence in the Conflict of Laws

INFLUENCE-CONFLIOT LAWS
".... if two persons fight in France, and both happen
casually to be here, one should bring an action of
assault against the other, it might be a doubt whether
such an action could be maintained here.... Therefore, without giving any opinion, it might perhaps be
triable only where both parties at the time were
subjects."
And so, also, was the language of Selwyn, L. J.,' in The
"Hal/ey"I extended. In these cases the court is not troubled
to explain the theory underlying the creation of rights and
correlative duties. In 1870 it was evidently thought sufficient to say that:
"A right of action, whether it arise from contract
governed by the law of the place or wrong, is equally
the creature of the law of the place and subordinate
thereto. . . . And in like manner the civil liability
arising out of a wrong derives its birth from the law
of the
place, and its character is determined by that
,
law."
Dicey says that "the nature of a right acquired under the
law of any civilized country must be determined in accordance with the law under which the right is acquired."'
The Americman View.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Huntington v.
AtraP stated that:
r" * * * in the case of a collision on an ordinary road in a foreign
country, where the rule of the road in force at the place of the collision may
be a necessary ingredient in the determination' of the question by whose
fault or negligence the alleged tort was committed. But in these and similar
cases the English court admits the proof of the foreign law * * * as one
of the facts upon which the existence of the tort, or the right to damages,
may depend, * * * but it is, in their lordship's opinion, alike contrary to
principle and to authority to hold, that an English court of justice will enfore a foreign municipal law, and will give a remedy in the shape of damages
in respect of an act which, according to its own principles, imposes no
liability on the person from whom the damages are claimed."
6L.IL 2 P. C. 193, (1868).
7Phillips v. Eyre, supra, n. 2.
8 DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 4th ed. (1927), p. 49.
9 146 U. S. 657 (1892).
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" ....
State,
wrong
a. like
where

a private action may be maintained in one
if not contrary to its own policy, for such a
done in another and actionable there, although
wrong would not be actionable in the state
the suit is brought."

In actions involving torts it is well established in this
country that the law of the place where the injury occurred
determines whether a right of action exists. "It is a general
principle, that, in order to maintain an action of tort founded
upon an injury to person and property, the act which is the
cause of the injury and the foundation of the action must at
least be actionable by the law of the place where it is done,
if not also by that of the place in which redress is sought.""
Thus, in England the investitive facts must (1) be actionable by the law of England, had they occurred there; and
(2) need not be such as would lay the basis for a civil action
by the law of the place where they occurred.
Contrarily, in the United States the investitive facts must
(1) not necessarily be actionable by the law of the forum
had the acts occurred there; and (2) must be such as would
found a civil action under the lew loci delicti.
The opposite results which these courts might reach on a
case involving identical situations of fact do not necessarily
involve any difference in fundamental legal theory as to the
creation of rights and duties; but may be reconciled on differ10 Davis v. N. Y. etc. R. R., 143 Mass. 301, 9 N. B. 815 (1887).
The court proceeds to say: "It must certainly be the right of each State
to determine by its laws under what circumstances an injury to the person
will afford a cause of action. If tlhis is not so, a person who is not a
citizen of the State, or who resorts to another State for his remedy, if
jurisdiction can be obtained, may subject the defendant in an action of
tort to entirely different rules and liabilities from those which would control the controversy were it carried on where the injury occurred; and, as
by the law of Massachusetts it is required that a person injured while
traveling upon a railroad must prove, not only the negligence of the defendant, but also that he himself was in the exercise of due care * *
the
plaintiff might relieve himself of the necessity of proving his own due care
if, by the law of the State to which he may resort, such proof is not roquired, and thus put upon the railroad company a higher responsibility
than is imposed by the State in which it was performing its business,"

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss3/3

4

Donley: The Modern Influence in the Conflict of Laws

INFLUENCE-CONFLICTLAWS
ent views as to the vague concept shrouded in the word
"policy". 1 Thus, the English court states that:
" . . .. it is, in their lordships' opinion, alike contrary to principle and to authority to hold, that an
English court of justice will enforce a foreign municipal law, and will give a remedy in the shape of
damages in respect of an act which, according to its
own principles, imposes no liability on the person
from whom the damages are claimed."' 2
But such a position of impeccable wisdom as to its own
methods of dealing with legal relations is not generally held
in this country. Less provincially the Supreme Court of the
United States indicated that so long as an action would lie
under the law of the place where the acts occurred, it need
not be actionable by the law of the forum. Thus a plaintiff
may recover if by the lew loci he would not be barred by
contributory negligence, although by the law of the forum
such negligence would have been a defense, had the acts
occurred there."
The Obligatio Theory.
Whatever may be the differences of policy in England and
in the United States as to whether the investitive facts must
be such as would have given rise to an action had they
occurred in the forum, yet the courts of both countries adopt,
apparently, the obligatio theory as substantially set forth
in Slater v. Mexican National Railway Company: 4
"' Of. Walsh v. N. Y. & New Engl. R. R., 160 Mlass. 571, 36 N. E. 584 (1894)
opinion by Holmes, J., wherein the statement is made that: ".... as between
the States of this Union, when a transitory cause of action had vested in
one of them under the common law as there understood and administered,
the mere existence of a slight variance of view in the forum resorted to,
not amounting to a fundamental difference of policy, should not prevent
an enforcement of the obligation admitted to have arisen by the law which
governed the conduct of the parties." The theory of law implied in this
excerpt will be the subject of comment subsequently, infra.
12 The "Halley," L. R. 2 P. C. 193 (1868).
13 Goodrich, "Tort Obligations and The Conflict of Laws," 73 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 19. It is stated that the law of the place where the injury was received determines whether a right of action exists, and that such is "the
rule prevailing in this country upon the subject and is sound upon principle
and authority."
14 194 U. S. 120 (1904).
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"The theory of the foreign suit is that although the
act complained of was subject to no law having force
in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio,
which, like other obligations, follows the person, and
may be enforced wherever the person may be found.
(Citing cases). But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that
that law determines not merely the existence of the
obligation, ....
but equally determines its extent."
This view is generally accepted as the correct one in this
country, and apparently also in England. The fundamental
premise of this theory may be illustrated as follows: If A
injures B negligently or wilfully in New York, then at that
time and place a right is created in B to recover damages
from A, and a correlative duty imposed upon A to pay these
damages, ipso facto by virtue of the laws of New York. It
further conceives that this right-duty relationship has some
of the attributes of personal property; that it can be carried
about from place to place by B and presented to a court
wherever A may be found, in much the same way that a
chattel might be offered for the inspection of a jury. The
court, viewing this obligation, recognizes it as a possession
of B which he acquired" at some prior time and in some
foreign place and proceeds to give executive aid accordingly.
In addition, there is the further concept that the forum must
measure the existence and extent of the obligation by the
lew loci.
15 Thus: "If P brings his action against D in New York for this Massachusetts battery he is not asking New York to give an extra-territorial
effect to the Massachusetts law. He asks that New York recognize and enforce his claim against D, aquired in Massachusetts and given by
Massachusetts law." Supra, n. 13.
It is submitted that if "acquiring" means anything it means that P has
something, tangible or intangible, with attributes which make ownership
or possession possible. Rules of law are hypotheses, having an abstract
existence distinguished from the written evidence thereof. For legal purposes they have little, if any, significance apart from the minds of the
judges who formulate the concept. Likewise "claim" is simply the concept of a jural relation. The result of the theory and terminology abovequoted is to state that prophecies as to the jural character of a given
relation existing between P and D can be brought from Massachusetts
to New York.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss3/3

6

Donley: The Modern Influence in the Conflict of Laws

INFLUENCE-CONFLICTLAWS
"If the acts of the parties impose no obligations on
the one hand and confer no rights upon the other,
where they occur, no good reason is apparent why
they should spring into active existence the moment
the parties pass into another jurisdiction, where, if
they had occurred therein, such relative rights and
obligations would have resulted. An act should be
judged by the law of the jurisdiction where it was
committed; the party acting or omitting to act must
be presumed to have been guided by the law in force
at the time and place, and to which he owed obedience;
if his conduct according to that law violated no right
of another, no cause of action arose, for actions at
law are provided to redress violated rights."'"
The justness of the result sought to be obtained by the
application of this rule may be circumvented by the rules
of procedure obtaining in the forum, as illustrated by the
following example:
P is driving his automobile on a highway in State X. D
approaches from the rear and attempts to pass P. D
attempts to sound a warning signal but the connection breaks
at the moment of attempting to pass and the cars collide,
P not knowing of D's presence and applying his brakes
suddenly. It is a rule of law in State X that the violation
of a statute enacted for the protection of individuals driving
on the highway is prima facie negligence. The statute likewise makes it the duty of D to sound a warning signal and
imposes a fine for failure so to do.
D moves to State Y where P brings suit. It is a rule
of law in State Y that the violation of such a statute is
evidence of negligence per se.
D's failure to sound the required signal at the time and
place of the collision was not in fact negligent, being due to
the unforseeable breaking of the electrical connection. He
has therefore not breached a duty owing to P. Did P acquire
a "right" in State X?
18 Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co., 48 Oh. St. 623

(1891).
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However, when P sues in State Y, D will not be permitted
to show that his conduct was not in fact negligent. And,
granting that the failure to sound the signal was the proximate and direct cause of the injury, P will recover. Theoretically, State Y is not imposing an obligation upon D which
did not exist in State X, but is simply determining the facts
of the case in accordance with its own rules of proof. The
effect therefore, is to alter the facts (negligence being a question of fact); or, to create a right-duty- concept different
from that which presumably would have been created under
the lex loci.
"In other words, a party is entitled to have the
forum attach the same legal effect to the ultimate
fact proved as would the lex loci; but he must convince the forum as to what these ultimate facts are
in the manner provided by the rules of the forum
itself.""'
Although cases may be found to the contrary, and although
there is little uniformity of agreement upon what are matters
of "substance" and what are matters of "procedure", it is
generally laid down that the rules of the forum control the
admissibility of evidence, the competency of witnesses, the
probative value of evidence, the quantum thereof necessary
to require submission of the facts to a jury, and the burden
of proof. Thus it frequently occurs that although the forum
clings to the obligatio theory of the creation of rights and
duties, yet it may create those which the lew loci presumably
would not have created and refuses to create others which
the latter might have evolved; and all this without the influence of a supposed public policy.
The Local La/w Theory.
The local law theory of the bases of conflict of laws is
stated by Cook as follows :18
17 See note in 12 MINN. L. REv. 263 at p. 266.
is"The Logical and Legal Bases of The Conflict of Laws," 33 YALE L. J.
457 (1924).
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".... the forum, when confronted by a case involving
foreign elements, always applies its own law to the
case, but in doing so adopts and inforces as its own
law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly
similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of
decision found in the system of law in force in another state or country with which same or all of the
foreign elements are connected, the rule so selected
being in normal cases, and subject to the exceptions
to be noted later, the rule of the decision which the
given foreign state or country would apply, not to
this very group of facts now before the court of the
forum, but to a similar but purely domestic group of
facts involving fon the foreign court no foreign ele.The forum thus enforces not a foreign
ments.....
right but a right created by its own law."'"
As to the concept that the law of the place creates an obligation at the time of the occurrence of the investitive facts,
the answer is made that:
"So, a statement that by the law of New York A
has under given circumstances, 'a right' and that B
is under a correlative 'duty' is a conventional way
of asserting that, on the basis of certain past behavior
of certain New York officials, we now predict that
New York officials will behave in a certain way if
specified events happen and the officials are set in
motion in the appropriate way by the injured party.
'Right', 'duty' and other names for legal relations are
therefore not names of objects or entities which have
an existence apart from the behavior of the officials
in question, but merely terms by means of which we
describe to each other what prophecies we make as to
the probable occurrence of a certain sequence of
events-the behavior of the officials." 20
19 Ibid., p. 469. The exceptions referred to are:
(1)
Where all facts occur in State A and suit is in State B. The rule
applied by State B is the rule which it would have to apply to the very
same case, (not a similar case); and
(2) Where State B applies the rule which State A would- have applied,
This involves
not to a purely domestic case, but to the very same case.
the application by State B of the rules of conflict of laws of State A.
20 Ibid., p. 746. The view is also taken that if P assaults D that act
creates a plurality of jural relations, in effect, as many as there are courts
which will recognize and sanction D's right.
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However it must be made clear that the difference in the two
theories is not one of mere language; one is not merely a
conventional way of phrasing the other. The difference is
fundamentally one which goes to the very foundation of legal
theory as to the nature of rights, powers, privileges and immunities and their correlatives, duties, liabilities, inabilities
and disabilities;21 and further as to their origin, creation
and sanction.
Legal. Phenomena.
Each science has its own aggregate of phenomena, and as
in physics and chemistry it is the function of theories to
describe and explain the nature of the physical world from
particular points of view, so is it the function of legal philosophy and jurisprudence to give an accurate analysis of
the mental and factual data which constitute legal phenomena. And any theory which must resort to fictions as substitutes for facts is pro tanto faulty, being somewhat comparable to the ancient physical d'ictrine that "nature abhors
a vacuum." What are the elements of legal phenomena with
which the legal scientist must deal as the chemist deals with
the elements of matter? Kocourek reduces them to three :22
(1)
(2)
(3)

A given rule of law, potentially existing in the
abstract, susceptible of application to
A situation of fact created by acts of two jural
persons, or/and the occurrence of events.
A jural relation, which operates as a connecting link between the legal rule and the situation of fact.

21 The correlative terms used are those adopted by KOCOUEK in "JURAL
RELATIONS" p. 97. It is not within the scope of this article to debate the
correctness of terminology or the fundamental difference in theory involved
therein. Suffice it to say that the writer is convinced that the Hohfeldian
correlatives of no-right-no-duty do not express the concept of a jural relation. The following articles are deserving of close inspection, IonuFLD,
"FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNcETIoNs", (1919); CLARK, "Relations, Legal and
Otherwise", .5 ILL QuAR. 26 (1922); GOBLE, "Negative Legal Relations?',
5 ILL. L. QuAa 36 (1922); ConnIN, "What Is a Legal Relation?", 5 ILL L.
QuAi. 50 (1922); KocounE,
"lNTon-Legal-Content Relations," 4 ILL. L.
QuAn. 233 (1922); GREN, "The Relativity of Legal Relations", 5 ILL L.
QuAR. 187 (1923).
22 KocouRmK, "JURAL RELATIONS", pp. 1-2.
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If X negligently injures Y in Pennsylvania, and it is a rule
of law in that State that "if one person negligently injures
another with resulting damage he shall be liable to respond
to the person so injured by the payment of monetary compensation", we have elements (1) and (2). But those elements standing alone give Y no compensation, for he must
first institute an action, presenting the facts to a judicial
body (a court of law), which will then afford him executive
sanction by directing the sheriff to levy upon the property
of X and realize therefrom the amount of money which has
been determined as compensating Y for the injury.
Relations between persons are of two sorts, jural or nonjural. The matter of definition is important and varies as
widely as these:
" . . . anything that can be expressed in the form
of a statement of law is a legal relation. Any statement of law that can be made about A and B expresses a legal relation to which A and B are
parties." 3
"A legal relation is the concept abstracted from a
situation of legal and material fact by virtue of which
one person presently or contingently, and either
directly or indirectly, may control the range of natural
physical freedom of movement of a human being in
favor of another person.""4
For present purposes it will be sufficient to treat "legal
relations" and "jural relations" as synonymous." If A lends
B $100.00 and B promises to pay A $100.00 in one month.
L. QuAB. 187 (1923).
24 N. 22, p. 75.
25 Jural relation "is used interchangeably with 'legal relation'; the
proper distinction is that a 'legal relation' is a concrete relation while a
'jural relation' is a legal relation considered abstractly. Courts deal with
legal relations; while jurists and theorists deal with jural relations." Supra,
n. 22, p. 435.
While this distinction is made by Professor Kocourek, the present writer
uses the terms synonymously, in the sense that in reality the relation,
whether denominated "legal" or "jural" is purely conceptual in nature. It
is doubtful whether the idea of concreteness adds clarity to discussion of
the questions discussed herein.
22 Green "The Relativity of Legal Relations", 5 ILL
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A has a claim to the payment of that sum and B owes a
correlative duty to tender it as the expiration of one month.
The relation between the parties is described as "primary.")
If B fails to comply with his promise, A's claim and B's
duty are destroyed simply by the mere passage of time, and
a new claim is created in A to have damages in the sum of
$100.00 and a new duty created in B to pay those damages.2
The new relation is "secondary." If the statute of limitations under the law of the forum is five years and A does
not institute an action until six years, he cannot recover;
not because his claim is destroyed, but because the statute
introduces a new element in the legal phenomenon which impels the court to create a new power in B superior in legal
effect to A's claim.
In such a situation the obligatio theory assumes that the
primary relation between A and B was a legal relation at
the time and place where the promise was made. We may
say that from a survey of the rules of the law of the lew looi
the prediction is that such a relation would be a legal relation
if a court adjudicated the matter. However, until the forum
is called upon so to determine the legal quality of the relation, it is still only a matter of prediction, although such
prediction may amount to a certainty. The case is plain
where the facts are not complicated and the rule of law is
well-settled. But if B promised to pay A $100.00 because
of the personal esteem which B held for A and because A
was his brother who had rendered medical services to B
while they were living in the same household, do those investitive facts create a legal relation between A and B?
That is to say, until the case is presented to a court for
adjudication, how can it be determined whether A may
2oCf. Kocourek, "Acts," 73 U. OF PA. Ii. REv. 335.
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"presently or contingently, directly or indirectly, control the
natural physical freedom" of B ?27 If a recovery is allowed
it is usual to say that a primary legal relation had once existed between the parties, followed by an obligation which
A carried about with him (the secondary relation). If recovery is denied, then it is plain that no legal relation ever
existed, or that it has been superseded by a superior relation
which defeats the action, or it has been destroyed.
Therefore, it is clear that in allowing a recovery in any
case the caurt oreates"8 the right and the correlative duty
and directs the executive sanction necessary to its existence.
We shall not debate here whether sanction is essential to the
existence of a legal relation. 9 Suffice it to say that since
legal relations are based on legal rules, and that by very
definition a legal rule is one supported by the power of the
State to compel obedience to it, if a sanction be lacking the
rule is not a rule of law, it is simply advice; and the relation is not a jural one, but indistinguishable from any other,
moral, social, or otherwise.
The sole function of a court is to create jural relations.
If it promulgates new rules of law (or mystically discovers
those which have been potentially existent) it is not acting

27 At this point the necessity of accurate definition is manifest. For example, the argument made is of no weight if a legal relation is merely a
statement of law which can be made about A and B. It is also of
primary importance to determine which legal person is the dominus and
which the servus of the relation. If, under the facts, a recovery is refused
and judgment rendered against A for costs, were the parties ever in legal
relationship?
The definition of a legal relation here adopted will not, of course, be understood as implying an actual physical restriction of freedom, e. g., as by incarceration.
25 "The activities of courts, as courts, in a strict sense, are reducible to
the creation of duties and the creation of powers. Courts never act in an
adjudicative capacity except where a legal relation has been violated. More
specifically, a court never acts as a court unless a duty has been infringed."
Supra, 22, p. 350.
29 "A sanction as applied to a legal rule is 'any conditional evil annexed
to a law, to produce obedience and conformity to it'." Supra n. 22, p. 343.

The point is also clear that sanctions may be applied to legal relations,
which are the products of legal rules.
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And since legal relations
as a court, but as a legislature."
exist only as prophecies until a court finally creates them
as such, as distinguished from all other types of relations
to which the investitive facts may give rise the fallacy of
the obligatio theory is at once apparent. When A assaulted
B in New York there was only the prediction that if suit
were brought the court would declare the relation to be a
legal one. Obviously it was not ipso facto created as such
at the time and place of the occurrence of the investitive
facts, for no court had been called upon to create it; and
as we have seen there is no other way for a legal relation to
be created. True, the acts themselves, and the events (such
as the passage of time) are the only source of the relation,
and those acts do have a specific reference to time and place.
But the legal or non-legal character of that relation has
no reference to dates and boundary lines other than those of
the forum. Prior thereto all probable consequences and
results were simply speculation. 1
We therefore have all the elements of legal phenomena
in the court of the forum. The plaintiff cannot bring to
it an "obligatio", but only his witnesses. The forum thus
determines the true investitive facts, applies its own law
(for it can apply no other) and creates the jural relation.
The fact that the court may, through consideration of policy
or concepts of justice, apply as its own rule, a rule identical
with that obtaining under the lew Zoci gives no more than
persuasive force to the latter. The forum is constrained by
no law except its own. It is therefore somewhat surprising
that Beale should state:
"If the law of the place where the parties act
refuses legal validity to their acts, it is impossible to
see on what principle some other law may nevertheless give their acts validity."8
8o "Courts in all countries have legislated (i. e., made legal rules) and
continue to do so. The common law is almost entirely a product of the
P. Supra, n. 22, p. 350.
courts ...
s1 Of. DODD "Jurisdiction in Personal Actions", 23 ILL L. 11EV. 427-431
(1929) ; "The idea of a right as something created by the law of a particular
place which, once created, becomes a possession of the plaintiff, is, however,
merely a mental concept and not an objective reality."
s2 BEALE, "What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract", 23 HEnv. L.
REv. 79, 267 (1909-10).
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Rather one should see that if the forum afford&no executive
sanction, if it refuses to create the jural relation by applying the only law which it has any power to apply, its own,
there is no principle upon which a recovery may be had.
For it is apparent that "each state has the right by virtue
of this sovereignty to apply to private international relations: (a) either the rules applying within the State to
purely national business; (b) or some foreign law, in some
way connected with the business in hand; (c) or independent
rules."3 This view requires modification to the extent that
(b) should state that the local rule applied is identical with
or highly similar to, such foreign law.
What are the implications of the local law theory? In
McDonald v. Mallory"4 the plaintiff sued to recover under
the wrongful death statute of New York. The deceased was
a New York citizen, and the injury causing the death had
occurred on the high seas on board of a vessel owned by
New York parties, and New York was likewise the home port
of the vessel. The court permitted a recovery on the theory
that New York law extended to the vessel and that the injury
therefore should be treated as though it had occurred in that
State. The court, in promulgating this fiction, stated:
"The liability of a person for his acts depends, in
general, upon the laws of the place where the acts
were committed, and although a civil right of action
acquired, or liability incurred, in one State or country
for a personal injury may be enforced in another to
which the parties may remove or where they may be
found, yet the right or liability must exist under the
laws of the place where the act was done. Actions
for injuries to the person committed abroad are sustained without proof in the first instance of the le.
loci, upon the presumption that the right to compensation for such injuries is recognized by the laws of
all countries."
as Kosters, "Public Policy in Private International Law", 29 YALE L. J.

745, at 748 (1920).
3477 N. Y. 546 (1879).
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And proceeded to demonstrate the necessity of the fiction
thus:
"... at the place where the injury was consummated
there was no law by which to determine whether or
not it rendered the defendants liable to an action,
unless the law of the State to which the vessel belonged followed her."
The implication of this and similar decisions is that there
is some inherent limitation in the power of courts which disables them from applying to such a situation their own rules
of law governing the relative rights and duties of the parties
in the absence of any rule of law shown to have been in
existence at the time and place of the occurrence. That it
may think it unjust, or unconscionable, or impolitic, is another matter; but that it does not have the absolute power
so to do is impossible to demonstrate. 5
Let us suppose that A and B are citizens of Massachusetts
and New York, respectively. They become members of
Commander Byrd's exploring party in the Antarctic. While
upon some hitherto undiscovered territory A becomes ill and
promises that if B will nurse him back to health, he will pay
B $1000.00. B agrees, but due to his negligent inattention,
it becomes necessary to amputate A's feet. Upon their return to America, B moves to New Jersey, and A sues him
there to recover damages for the loss of his feet, alleging B's
negligent omissions. A files a plea setting up that at the
time and place of the occurrence there was no law in force
in the Antarctic; that A's allegations that it was B's (1 ,,y
not to injure him negligently are untrue for the reason that
there was no law that imposed such a legal duty upon B;
that having violated no legal duty, there is no cause of
action; and that B's duty cannot be measured by the laws of
3r Cf. DIcEY, n. 8, supra, p. 827: "'When an act which damages A or his
property is done by X in a barbarous country, the character of the act
cannot depend on the law of the country where it was done. If both X and
A are domiciled in England, the act is probably wrongful and actionable
in England. If the two parties are domiciled, the one in England and
the other, e. g., in Germany, then the act is probably actionable in England and according to the law of Germany,"
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New Jersey, New York, or Massachusetts because those laws
can have no operation beyond the territorial limits of the
respective states."
Under the obligatio theory it is difficult to discover upon
what principle a recovery could be allowed, for surely A
acquired no obligation which he could carry from the frozen
South Seas to New Jersey and there enforce against B.
Were B's omissions other than immoral, inhuman, or antisocial? There could be no such obligation because there
was no law in force at the time and place which would create
it. "The only source of this obligation is the law of the place
of the act . . . that law determines not merely the existence
of the obligation, . . . but equally its extent."
Yet it will not be disputed that here is a situation which
demands that A be afforded a remedy against B. If the New
Jersey court proceeded under the local law theory it is believed that it might well say, "We are not concerned with
the creation of obligations by foreign laws, but with the
creation of rights and duties by this court. In determining
whether we shall create a jural relation in this instance, or
in any instance, we can apply no other rules of law except
our own, for we have no power to apply the rules of other
jurisdictions, which -are not in force in this state. In choosing what our own rule of law shall be, we may adopt any
which seems to us to be sound in principle and in consonance
with the tenets of justice. Since B is now a citizen of New
Jersey, we might apply the New Jersey rules of law applicable to similar cases involving no foreign element. However, we choose to take as the proper rule one identical with
35 See Frederick J. De Sloovere, "The Local Law Theory and its Implications", 41 HAv. L. REv. 421 (1928) : "In a word, in no case is the power
of the forum to re-create rights and enforce decrees any greater than that
of the foreign jurisdiction where the acts occurred. Thus we get nowhere
by glorifying the power of the forum and disregarding the power of the
locus."
The writer submits that the foregoing statement is subject to the following criticisms: (1) the forum does not re-create rights, but creates them
in the first instance; (2) it is flatly disproved by such cases as Machado v.
Fontes, in which the English court did create a civil right of action (and
therefore had the power to do so), while in Brazil no civil right was capable
of creation, under the facts of the case.
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the law of New York, applicable to a purely domestic situation, for the reason that at the time of the occurrence of the
injury, B was a citizen of that state, and we think it wise in
policy to do so for the reason that as such a citizen, B's conduct should be measured according to principles of tort
liability with which he is, or ought to have been, most
familiar, and as imposing the least hardship thereby."87
That is, of course, on the assumption that New Jersey has
no binding precedent governing cases of this character. Reverting to Machado v. Fontes8" we are struck by the fact
that a recovery was permitted although the law of the place
of the injury gave no right of action for civil damages, and
therefore in a strict sense is not in consonance with the
obligatio theory. However we find Dicey saying:
"Thus, X and A are Englishmen, living in England.
X, out of gratitude to A, but for no consideration
whatever, promises A to pay him £100. The promise
gives A no legal right whatever, under English law,
to the payment of the £100 by X. Both parties being
in France, A sues X in a French Court for the £100
as a debt owing to him. If A's claim be measured,
as it ought to be, by English law, then A will recover
nothing; having acquired no right to payment under
English law, he possesses no right which he can enforce in France. If, on the other hand, the nature
37 Apparently Professor Cook does not conclude that the theory can be extended to cover eases of this character. See n. 17, supra, p. 484: "My conclusion then is, that while, so long as we have the territorial organization
of modern political society, the law of a given state or country can be enforced only within its territorial limits, this does not mean that the law
of that state or country cannot, except in certain exceptional cases, affect
the legal relations of persons outside its limits.... Whatever be the legal
limitations upon the power of a state or country to affect the legal relations
of persons anywhere in the world, they must be found in positive law of
some kind-he the same international law or constitutional law, and do not
inhere in the constitution of the legal universe."
If not already apparent, the writer's view not only that the theory is
capable of such extension, but that it must be so extended, is the result of
the following reasoning: The rules of law of the lex loci, being simply conceptual, cannot attach to the acts of the parties (unless made a part of
the investitive facts as hereinafter explained); they have no force in the
forum greater than persuasive. Thus, the forum has the power to attach
whatever jural consequences to the acts of the parties that it may choose,
since in so doing, it will always apply its own law.
In so adjudicating, the forum is not constrained, in the absence of precedent, by considerations other than those of "policy".
as fupre, n. 3.
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of A's claim be not measured by English law, then
he may very possibly recover £100; with the result
that he enforces not a right duly acquired under English law, but a non-existent right which the French
Courts erroneously thought he had acquired under
English law.""9
To state that a recovery may be had on the basis of a nonexistent right erroneously conceived to be a jural claim is to
confound logic and reduce the science of the law to the point
of absurdity. If a remedy is afforded by the French Court
it is because that court has by the application of the only
legal rules which it can apply (its own) to a situation of
fact presented to it, evolved the concept of a jural relation
existing between A and X, a right-duty relation. That right
and correlative duty come into existence, as jural, only when
and if the concept is formed in the minds of the judges and
executive sanction is imposed. Therefore, by permitting a
recovery the court adjudicates that A did have a legal right.
The statement that a right was non-existent, and in the next
phrase admitting that a remedy may be had, will hardly be
understood by anyone; especially X, who must pay the
damages. 0
Much of the confusion arising out of the obligatio theory
seems traceable to the idea that rules of law themselves
create or impose rights and duties. As we have seen these
rules are but one element in the complete legal phenomenon.
Like jural relations they are but concepts having no existence apart from the minds of the officials of the sovereign
nation or State who are called upon to apply them, acting
39 Supra, n. 8, p. 50.
40 See Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N. E. 837 (1916),

CABDOZO,
J.: ".... the normal exercise of the State's power is through the agency of
the courts, and hence a right which, when violated, does not create a right
of action, is shorn of most of the incidents that make a legal right of value."
In the opinion the Slater Case is quoted with approval.
Seabury, J., dissenting: "To argue that there can be no right because there
is no remedy is to invert the maxim that there is no wrong without a
remedy...."
Quaere: Wether this decision, in its emphasis upon the importance of
remedy, lends any support to the local law theory. Apparently not: "It is
not accurate, therefore, to say even today that the primary right is onO
established by the law of New York."
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under authority therefrom. If all the written evidence contained in constitutions, statutes and reported decisions were
simultaneously destroyed the law itself would not be destroyed so long as the State agents continued to perform
their official tasks. Upon the other hand, if a revolution overthrows the power of those officials, there is no law though
there be ten thousand statutes and reported decisions in
existence. Plainly only one element of a legal phenomenon
has objective realty-the investitive facts, and they may have
no present existence. That such a theory is uncomfortably
nebulous is demonstrated by the language of the reported
decisions in clinging to such terminology as "vested rights"
and "acquired claims". One feels more secure in saying
that he owns the home in which he lives than in saying that
if anyone attempts to interfere with his possession and control over it the prophecy is that a court of law would afford
him protection or compensate him in damages. It is a
language of escape-escape from the mental to the physical
world, from rights as concepts to rights as chattels which
somehow may be grasped and held against all invasion.
Criticism of the Local Law Theory.
In the hypothetical case of A and B in the Antarctic is
seen the limitless extent to which the local law theory may
be logically extended. The practical difficulties in applying
it to such a situation of fact are perhaps immaterial but present themselves to any lawyer familiar with the requirements of pleading. For that reason they may be briefly
mentioned. A's lawyer immediately finds himself under the
necessity of alleging facts showing the existence of a legal
right and the breach of a legal duty, with resulting damage.
Assuredly he cannot allege that it was the legal duty of B
to exercise due care not to injure A's person for the reason
that the facts incontrovertibly are that B was beyond the
pale of any law whatever which could define that duty, or
command, through any State agency, obedience to it. What
sovereign had any power to control B's actions? Suppose
that under the laws of Abyssinia it is illegal to give aid to
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any person physically disabled, on the theory that the processes of nature and the will of whatever gods may be should
not be frustrated. Why should Abyssinian definitions of
legal duty be any less applicable to B than those of New
York or New Jersey, if he be beyond the pale of both? Thus,
A's lawyer will be constrained to plead the breach of a legal
duty. B may properly reply that he has complied with his
legal duty as defined under Abyssinian laws. If A rejoins
that those laws are irrelevant and inapplicable, B may
answer that they have exactly as much relevance as those of
any one of the United States.
The requirements of pleading are themselves the result of
the concept that remedies exist for the redress of violated
"rights";41 rights that are defined as primary: the right of
integrity of the person, and the like. By very terminology,
"primary" precedes "secondary" in point of time. It is
therefore not difficult to perceive that the idea of time with
reference to the occurrence of the investitive facts has been
carried over into the idea of time with reference to the creation of rights and duties. And the concept is thus that a
primary right does have an existence at some date prior to
the creation of a secondary right. The hypothetical case,
for example, assumes that on January 1st A had a right
of integrity of the person; that on February 1st B, by his
omissions to attend A, infringed or destroyed that right;
and that therefore a new right is created in A to have
damages from B.
It is not necessary to labor for the obvious. At the risk
of doing so it may be stated that the local law theory adequately dissipates the fallacies of primary and secondary
rights in relation to the calendar. But it is said that:
"Historically, rights grew out of remedies, but
analytically rights are always precedent..... .Yet
Bartolus saw the necessity of regarding the analytical
view in the conflict of laws. This view is clearly
necessary today."4
42 See n. 16, supra.
42

N.

36, 8upra, p. 431.
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This observation is offered in derogation of the local law
theory, but it is submitted that its ultimate soundness is
demonstrated thereby. The very point of emphasis is that
rights (primary) are precedent, but analytically; which is
to say as conceived by the minds of those who analyze; not
in actual point of time intervening between the creation of
those rights. It is clear that a right is simply the concept
of the dominant side of a jural relation. As such it has no
existence except in the minds of the judges who are called
upon to deal with its creation. The forum, in affording a
remedy, is necessarily called upon to define or at least to
formulate its concept of any given relation as jural or nonjural. The fact that in so doing it is guided by the persuasive force of rules of law promulgated by another sovereign nation or State (mental data to assist in reaching a
conclusion) in no wise alters the facts: (1) that the court
is the sole body which formulates with any legal effect, the
concept of the jural relations, and (2) imposes the sanction
which is essential to its legal character.
And the further consideration that before conceiving of
the remedial or secondary relation it was logically necessary
to conceive that there had been another and primary relation
between the parties, in no wise proves that that primary
relation in reality existed at the time when and place where
the investitive facts occurred.
The quoted criticism does, however, afford indicia to what
is believed to be a valid objection: to the local law theory.
It is submitted that too great emphasis is placed upon the
word "policy". 3 The selection of that term is possibly unfortunate for the reason that its connotations carry with it
the implication that social or moral considerations are to be
given legal efficacy. For example, a court may deny a
43 Another interesting expression from the courts is contained in The
"Scotland", 105 U. S. 24 (1881) : ".... if a collision occurs on the high seas,
where the law of no particular state has exclusive force, but all are equal,
any forum called upon to settle the rights of the parties would prima facio
determine them by its own law as presumptively expressing the rules of
justice."
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remedy upon a gambling contract as being against the "public
policy" of the State. But as employed in the local law
theory the term has a wider significance: the power of the
forum to exercise a freedom of choice as to the particular
rule of law which it will apply by way of analogy from the
rule existing in some other jurisdiction, and having some
connection with the occurrence of the facts. The absolute
power of the forum is restricted in fact by (1) the binding
force of its own precedents, and (2) the nature and character
of the investitive facts. These two elements of the legal
phenomenon are as essential to its existence as the third:
the concept of the jural relation. The influence of those
elements as a limitation upon the unrestricted power of the
court will be mentioned briefly.
The precedents of the forum dealing with conflicts of law
cases must be considered. If those precedents announce that
the forum will, for example, "apply the law of the place
where the acts of the parties occurred" to cases involving
foreign elements, then the court, in 1929, must in effect do
likewise. This is in no degree altered if the court says that
it will apply its own law, which shall be a rule identical
with that existing at the place where the acts occurred.
Whatever may be the theory, the fact is that the court is
bound by precedent to decide the case in a certain way;
which, again is to say that it is bound to create certain jural
relations, or to refuse to create certain others.
Secondly, is a rule of law a fact which, by express or implied intendment of the parties, may become part of the
factual data composing the second element of the legal phenomenon? At the most, it is a conceptual fact, but the courts
treat it as a physical fact, thus:
"When the evidence consists of the parol testimony
of experts as to the existence or prevailing construction of a statute, or as to any point of unwritten law,
the jury must determine what the foreign law is, as
in the case of any controverted fact depending upon
like testimony . . . . and when the evidence admitted
consists entirely of a written document, statute or
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judicial opinion, the question of
4 its construction
effect is for the court alone.""

A and B enter into a written contract in Michigan for the
sale of 1000 pairs of shoes to be delivered in Canada. Suppose that the parties consult lawyers, and upon their advice
insert a clause that "if any defects are found to exist in
said shoes upon delivery to and inspection by the buyer,
then the liability of the seller, if any, shall be determined
under the rules of law now enacted in the State of Michigan
with reference to implied warranties of quality in cases of
like character." Half of the shoes prove to be faulty, and
B enters suit in Illinois, where A has gone to reside.
The Illinois court will have no power, in the absence of a
public policy to the contrary, to adopt as its own rule any save
one identical with that enacted in the State of Michigan. That
clause of the contract is as much the expressed intent of the
parties as any other. Suppose that the rule of law enacted
in Michigan and as construed by that court is such as tn
impose liability upon A, (or the prophecy of a liability).
This is tantamount to B's saying to A, "If these shoes are
faulty, then I will pay all damages you may suffer by reason
of those defects". Such a promise is an investitive fact. If
it is expressed in terms of a rule of law, is it any the less
such a fact?'"

44Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253 (1868).

45In Forepaugh v. D. L. & W. R. R Co., 128 Pa. St. 217 (1889), the defendant entered into a contract to carry the plaintiff's circus; the contract
contained a clause releasing the defendant from all damages, even though
caused by its own negligence; the other relevant facts sufficiently appear
from the following:
"The contract was made, was to be performed, and the alleged breach
occurred, in New York. No possible element was wanting, therefore, to
make it a New York contract. It is admitted that in New York the stipulation is valid, and this action could not be maintained, (citing cases). Why,
then, should plaintiff, by stepping across the boundary into Pennsylvania, acquire rights which he has not paid for, and his contract does not give him?"
It is submitted that this decision does not proceed upon the theory that
the New York rule of law became, by implication, a part of the contract,
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The conclusion is the same if the intent of the parties be
not expressed in writing, unless the instrument be regarded
as more than mere evidence of that intent. If the parties
have said nothing, with reference thereto, the inference of
fact is conjectural, but the forum may presume that the
parties acted (1) with reference to the law of the place where
the contract was entered into; or (2) the law of the place of
performance, i. e., by delivery. The presumption takes the
place of actual proof, but whatever the manner or degree of
proof requires it is still a fact which is established, viz., the
intent of the parties.
Thus, wherever the parties by actual expression or necessary implication, have agreed that the legal relations, if any,
thereafter to be created by any court between them, shall be
determined by the application of a rule of the forum identical
with that potentially existing in a foreign jurisdiction, then
the absolute power of the forum, (in the absence of precedent and a contrary "public policy") is limited to that
8
extent."

but on the view that "the ce tainty requisite to justice can be obtained
only by following the local tribunals as regards the contracts made in each
locality," a consideration of policy.
However, the implied clauses of a contract are as much a part thereof
as those actually in writing, under familiar principles of construction. Of
course, a rule of law, being conceptual in nature, cannot be incorporated
into a contract. But a clause identical with the written evidence expressing
that concept has precisely the same effect. It is in this sense that a rule of
law can be said to become part of a contract, and the writer admits that
this view is open to the criticism above indicated.
4 The arguments hereinbefore advanced with reference to contracts do
not apply to injuries to the person or property for the reason that a presumption that the parties acted with knowledge of, and intending to rely upon,
the rules of law of the place of the act could not be considered as a fact,
but simply as a motive force acting upon the parties, at the most. In addition, by very definition all cases involving negligence are predicated upon
the failure of the negligent party to act or to omit to act in accordance with
the rules of law defining his duty toward the person so injured. Thus no
presumption could be emptier and more contrary to fact than this: that D, in
negligently injuring P, is presumed to have had in mind a concept of any
rule of law imposing a duty upon him; or that P, in suffering the injury
conceives of a duty owing to him.
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This is a limitation imposed not by extra-territorial effect
of the foreign law, but by the nature of the investitive facts;
and since it is not claimed that under the local law theory
the court may disregard those facts, a great deal of argument may have been advanced to knock down a straw man.
However since the local law theory purports to be an analysis
of what the courts do, as distinguished from what they say,
the emphasis is placed upon results. And the result indicated in the foregoing discussion is exactly the same as if
the forum were constrained not by the facts, but by the
extra-territorial operation of the foreign law.
The foregoing limitations upon the unrestricted power of
the forum are left by the local law theory to "policy". In
a word, that term infers a freedom of choice which does not
have existence in fact. It is submitted that the theory should
take these limitations into account. Of .course, it is within
the power of a court to disregard precedent and to refuse
recognition of the facts of a case, and to render any sort of
decision which it may choose.
Logically, the local law theory is sounder than the obligatio
theory for the reason that it more nearly describes the
processes involved in the actual decision of cases. It is
true that a rule of law is a concept; that a jural relation is
a concept; that they have no existence for legal purposes
with reference to space or time; and that therefore they
cannot be carried from place to place.
But it may well be doubted whether any theory which
relies upon logic alone can be sufficient. Prejudice, emotion,
superstition, and varied occult influences are quite as important in determining what legal relations shall be created.
A complete legal theory should account for the imponderable elements. Further, theory should comport with the
varying stages of the maturity of the legal science of which
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it is a part. The local law theory, it is believed, is more
nearly an analysis of that immature stage of the law wherein
remedy is a dispensation somewhat within the arbitrary
power of the sovereign to make. It would admirably fit
the material of legal science in a newly-inhabited country
where precedent is of little or no importance. But in the
maturity of the law the very idea of stability and predictability is an interest to be secured, and is of the highest importance.
Doubtless courts will continue to follow the language of
the precedents, reiterating their fictions, with some limited
exceptions. 4 And doubtless we cannot here debate the
utility of pure theory. The suggestion has been made that
whatever the pretensions of the law to the appellation
"science" may be, they will be aided by conformity of theory
to fact. Otherwise, new factual data may become increasingly unintelligible. The conclusion has also been advanced
that we can no longer regard the law from the nineteenth
century viewpoint as a force, an entity, distinct from the
personalities of those who administer it. The influence of
modernity has been felt. The law must be regarded not as
the invisible, intangible protector of "rights" of person and
property but as an analysis of what a small group of individuals have done with reference to the daily affairs of
the remaining individuals whereby we may speculate as to
the future disposition of similar affairs. Thus "rights" and
"'duties", "powers" and "liabilities", and the like may come
to be regarded simply as convenient nouns employed in the
discussion of what shall be the outcome of A versus B.

47 Of. Guiness, et al. v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769 (1923). Learned Hand, D. J.:
"However, no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign, and
when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he

can only invoke an obligation recognized by that sovereign."
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As indicated, this view is not particularly comfortable.
The same sense of insecurity underlies criticism of modernity
in religion, in ethics. But the essence of that spirit is truly
scientific in searching for facts without reference to the
effect thereof upon the discoverer. Therefore, legal writers
will, it is presumed, continue to restate and revive legal
theories in accordance with observed factual data. Otherwise, all pretensions to science must be faintly humorous.
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